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Discourse Representation Theory 
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In the early 1980s, Discourse Representation Theory (DRT) was introduced by 
Hans Kamp as a theoretical framework for dealing with issues in the semantics 
and pragmatics of anaphora and tense (Kamp 1981); a very similar theory was 
developed independently by Irene Heim (1982). The distinctive features of DRT, 
to be discussed below, are that it is a mentalist and representationalist theory of 
interpretation, and that it is a theory of the interpretation not only of individual 
sentences but of discourse, as well. In these respects DRT made a clear break 
with classical formal semantics, which during the 1970s had emanated from 
Montague's pioneering work (Thomason 1974), but in other respects it continued 
the tradition, e.g. in its use of model-theoretical tools. In the meantime, DRT has 
come to serve as a framework for explaining a wide range of phenomena, but we 
will confine our attention to three: anaphora, presupposition, and tense. For 
references to work on other topics, see the “Further reading” section. 
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1. Introduction 
This article concerns Discourse Representation Theory narrowly defined as work 
in the tradition descending from Kamp (1981). The same term is sometimes used 
more broadly, occasionally embracing Heim's work (“File Change Semantics”, 
FCS) and the developments in Dynamic Semantics (DS) initiated by Groenendijk 
and Stokhof (1991). The term DRT is not typically used for Fauconnier's (1984, 
1985) Mental Spaces (MS) model, though his work shares strong commonalities 
with that of both Heim and Kamp. The differences between DRT (narrowly 
defined) and the various related theories we have mentioned are summarized in 
Table 1. 
DRT's main (and most controversial) innovation, beyond the Montagovian 
paradigm which was then considered orthodox, is that it introduced a level of 
mental representations, called discourse representation structures (DRSs). The 
basic idea is rather straightforward. It is that a hearer builds up a mental 
representation of the discourse as it unfolds, and that every incoming sentence 
prompts additions to that representation. This picture has always been 
commonplace in the psychology of language. DRT's principal tenet is that it 
should be the starting point for semantic theory, too. 
A theory of the DRT family consists of the following ingredients: 
 A formal definition of the representation language, consisting of: 
 a recursive definition of the set of all well-formed DRSs, and  
 a model-theoretic semantics for the members of this set;  
 a construction procedure, which specifies how to extend a given DRS when 
Table 1: Comparison of DRT-like theories
Theory Status of post-
syntax (or post-
LF) 
representations
Construction Model-
theoretic 
interpretation
DRT essential (but see 
below)
systematic 
procedure (but 
see below)
yes
FCS non-essential intended to be 
compositional
yes
MS essential informal 
procedure
no
DS non-essential fully 
compositional[1]
yes
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a sentence comes in.  
Technically, this is very similar to earlier work in formal semantics, with two 
exceptions: the interpretation process always takes the previous discourse into 
account, and the level of semantic representations is claimed to be essential. What 
has worried semanticists is not so much the fact that DRSs are mental 
representations, but that an additional level is needed; we will return to this point 
in Section 6. 
2. Donkey pronouns 
The relationship between a pronoun and its antecedent is one that has received a 
great deal of attention in linguistics and philosophy. We say that a pronoun is 
anaphoric, as opposed to deictic, for example, if it depends for its interpretation 
on an antecedent expression elsewhere in the sentence or the discourse. In some 
cases the nature of this dependency seems straightforward: 
(Here and henceforth we use underlining to highlight the anaphoric links we are 
currently interested in.) Since “Pedro” is a referential expression, it makes sense, 
in this case, to say that “his” is a referential term, too, which derives its reference 
from its antecedent. This construal is plausible enough, but it doesn't apply across 
the board: 
The term “no farmer” is not a referential expression, so “his” cannot be 
coreferential with it. Rather, it would seem that, in this case, the relationship 
between the pronoun and its antecedent is one of binding, in the logical sense of 
the word: “no farmer” and “his” are interpreted as a quantifier and a variable, 
respectively, and the former binds the latter. 
It is fairly obvious that the bound-variable construal of pronouns is subject to 
syntactic constraints. Most importantly, this type of interpretation requires that 
the pronoun be c-commanded by its antecedent, where c-command is defined as 
follows: 
A c-commands B iff B is, or is contained in, a sister constituent of A's. 
The constituent structure of sentence [2] is [S [NP No farmer][VP beat [NP his 
donkey]]]. Here the pronoun is contained in the sister of its antecedent, so the c-
command constraint is met. In [3] “no farmer” does not c-command “his”, and so 
we predict, correctly, that the pronoun cannot be bound. 
[1] Pedro beats his donkey.
[2] No farmer beats his donkey.
[3] His donkey likes no farmer.
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Since the syntactic structure of [1] is identical to that of [2], we might wonder if 
the pronoun in [1] may not be bound by its antecedent, just as in [2]. If this were 
possible, there would be two ways of construing the pronoun in [1]: it could 
function either as a referential term or a bound variable. There is evidence that 
this is indeed the case: 
[4a] is ambiguous in a way [4b] is not. Its second conjunct can be construed as 
saying either that Juan beats his own donkey or that Juan beats Pedro's donkey. 
The second conjunct of [4b], by contrast, can only be interpreted as saying that 
Juan beats his own donkey. If the possessive pronoun in the first conjunct of [4a] 
can be either referential or a bound variable, the contrast is readily explained. 
In large part, the motivation for developing dynamic theories of interpretation, 
beginning with DRT, was the realization that the dichotomy between referential 
and bound-variable (occurrences of) pronouns is less natural than one might 
think—less natural in the sense that some pronouns don't fit comfortably in either 
category. 
What is the relationship between “it” in the second sentence and its antecedent 
expression in the first? On the one hand, it cannot be coreference. If the pronoun 
were coreferential with its antecedent, the indefinite “a donkey” would have to be 
a referential term, which seems unlikely, e.g. because the negation of [5a] says 
not that there is a donkey that Pedro fails to own, but rather that he doesn't own 
any donkey, and furthermore, if [5a] is negated, the anaphoric link between the 
pronoun and its antecedent is severed: 
(The asterisk indicates that the sentence is infelicitous if “a donkey” is to be 
interpreted as the antecedent of “it”.) Observations like these suggest rather 
strongly that indefinites are quantifiers rather than referential terms. However, if 
we construe “a donkey” as an existential quantifier, how does it manage to bind 
the pronoun across a sentence boundary? 
The problem with [5] is related to the fact that the pronoun and its indefinite 
antecedent occur in different sentences. The following examples show, however, 
that similar problems arise within sentences: 
[7a] If Pedro owns a donkey, he beats it. 
[4a] Pedro beats his donkey, and Juan does, too.
[4b] Every farmer beats his donkey, and Juan does, too.
[5a] Pedro owns a donkey.
[5b] It is grey.
[6a] Pedro doesn't own a donkey. [6b] *It is grey.
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[7b] Every farmer who owns a donkey beats it. 
These are the infamous “donkey sentences”, which were already discussed by 
scholastic philosophers, and in modern times were reintroduced into philosophy 
by Geach (1962). In these cases it is obvious that the pronouns don't refer, so they 
can't be coreferential with their antecedents, either. Nor are the pronouns bound 
by their antecedents, for they aren't c-commanded by them. The constituent 
structure of [7b] is roughly as follows: 
[S [NP Every [N farmer who owns [NP a donkey]]] [VP beats it]]
 
Whatever the syntactical details, “a donkey” is too deeply embedded for it to c-
command “it”. The same goes for [7a]. Hence, the neuter pronouns in these 
sentences cannot be construed as bound variables. 
Another way of showing that these pronouns are problematic is by considering 
how we might render these sentences in predicate logic. The most obvious 
interpretation of [7a] is that Pedro beats every donkey he owns, and [7b] is 
naturally interpreted as claiming that every farmer beats every donkey he owns. 
(So, somewhat surprisingly, it appears that the indefinites in these sentences have 
universal force.) These readings may be captured as follows: 
[9a] ∀x[[donkey(x) & own(Pedro,x)] → beat(Pedro,x)] 
[9b] ∀x∀y[[farmer(x) & donkey(y) & own(x,y)] → beat(x,y)] 
So the problem is not that predicate logic fails to capture the meanings of [7a] 
and [7b]. The problem is, rather, how to derive [9a] and [9b] from [7a] and [7b] 
in a principled way. In order to derive these logical forms, we have to assume not 
only that an indefinite expression buried in a subordinate position ends up having 
wide scope, but also that it acquires universal force in the process. A theory based 
on such assumptions might capture the facts, but it would be clearly ad hoc, and 
would generate a host of false predictions, as well. 
The upshot of the foregoing observations is that, apparently, indefinites are 
neither quantifiers nor referential terms, and this problem entrains another one, 
for as long as it unclear what indefinites mean, it will also remain obscure how 
they can serve as antecedents to pronouns. Later on we will see that very similar 
problems arise in seemingly disparate domains, like the interpretation of tense 
and presuppositions. 
3. Basic DRT 
This section introduces DRT in informal terms. We show how a hearer builds up 
a mental model of the ongoing discourse, dealing not only with simple sentences, 
but also with conditionals, quantification, and anaphora, and we discuss DRT's 
treatment of indefinites, and how they are set apart from quantifying expressions. 
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3.1 The key ideas 
A discourse representation structure (DRS) is a mental representation built up by 
the hearer as the discourse unfolds. A DRS consists of two parts: a universe of 
so-called “discourse referents”, which represent the objects under discussion, and 
a set of DRS-conditions which encode the information that has accumulated on 
these discourse referents. The following DRS represents the information that 
there are two individuals, one of which is a farmer, the other a donkey, and that 
the former chased the latter: 
[1] [x, y: farmer(x), donkey(y), chased(x,y)] 
The universe of this DRS contains two discourse referents, x and y, and its 
condition set is {farmer(x), donkey(y), chased(x,y)}. 
A DRS like the one in [1] can be given a straightforward model-theoretic 
interpretation. In DRT this is done by means of embedding functions, which are 
partial functions from discourse referents to individuals in a given model M. An 
embedding function f verifies [1] in M iff the domain of f includes at least x and 
y, and according to M it is the case that f(x) is a farmer, f(y) is a donkey, and f(x) 
chased f(y). 
Meanwhile it will have become clear that the DRS in [1] is designed to reflect the 
intuitive meaning of: 
[2] A farmer chased a donkey. 
Indeed, it is claimed that, in the absence of any information about the context in 
which this sentence is uttered, [1] is the semantic representation of [2]. So the 
indefinite expressions “a farmer” and “a donkey” prompt the introduction of two 
new discourse referents, x and y, and contribute the information that x is a farmer 
and y a donkey, while the verb contributes the information that the former chased 
the latter. 
If a discourse begins with an utterance of [2], the DRS in [1] is constructed, and 
this DRS forms the background against which the next utterance is interpreted. 
Suppose now that [2] is followed by a token of [3a]: 
[3a] He caught it. 
[3b] [v, w: caught(v,w)] 
[3b] is the DRS that reflects the semantic content of [3a] before the pronouns are 
resolved. In this DRS, the anaphoric pronouns “he” and “it” in [3a] are 
represented by the discourse referents v and w, respectively. These discourse 
referents are underlined to indicate that they require an antecedent. Since [3a] is 
uttered in the context of [1], the next step in the interpretation of this sentence is 
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to merge the DRS in [3b] with that in [1]. The result of this merging operation is 
[4a]: 
[4a] [x, y, v, w: farmer(x), donkey(y), chased(x,y), caught(v,w)] 
[4b] [x, y, v, w: v = x, w = y, farmer(x), donkey(y), chased(x,y), 
caught(v,w)] 
[4c] [x, y: farmer(x), donkey(y), chased(x,y), caught(x,y)] 
Since [3a] is immediately preceded by [2], the antecedent of “he” is probably 
(though not necessarily) “a farmer”, while “it” is anaphorically dependent on “a 
donkey”. At DRS level, this is represented by equating the discourse referents v 
and w with x and y, respectively. These operations yield [4b], which is equivalent 
to [4c]. Either DRS is verified in a model M iff M features a farmer who chased 
and caught a donkey. 
Thus far, we have only considered DRSs with simple conditions, but in order to 
account for negated and conditional sentences, say, complex conditions are 
required. 
[5a] Pedro doesn't have a donkey. 
[5b] [1 x: Pedro(x), ¬[2 y: donkey(y), owns(x,y)] ]
 
[5b] is the sentence DRS corresponding to [5a]. This DRS contains a condition 
that consists of a DRS prefixed by a negation sign. For ease of reference we will 
sometimes adorn DRSs with numerical labels, as we have done in [5b], and use 
these in names like “[5b1]”, “[5b2]”, and so on. In general, labeling of DRSs will 
be top-down and left-to-right, so the main (or principal) DRS will always be 
number one. 
A function f verifies [5b1] in a model M iff f maps x onto an individual in M 
which “is a Pedro”, i.e. which is called “Pedro”, and f cannot be extended to a 
function g which verifies [5b2]—that is to say, no such g should map y onto a 
donkey that Pedro owns. 
[5b2] contains a token of the discourse referent x which is introduced externally, 
in the DRS in which [5b2] is embedded, i.e. [5b1]. Apart from that, [5b2] also 
introduces a discourse referent of its own, i.e., y, which is associated with the 
indefinite NP “a donkey”, and whose scope is delimited by [5b2]. Consequently, 
it doesn't make sense to refer to y outside of [5b2]. In DRT, this is taken to 
explain why the “lifespan” of the individual introduced by the indefinite NP in 
[5a] is delimited by the scope of the negation operator. If [5a] were followed by 
[6a], for example, the pronoun could not be linked to the indefinite: 
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If we merge [5b] and [6b], which is the sentence DRS corresponding with [6a], 
we obtain [6c]. In this representation, the discourse referent z does not have 
access to y, because y is introduced in a DRS that is not accessible to the DRS in 
which z is introduced, and therefore it is not possible to bind z to y. In other 
words, if [6a] is preceded by [5a], the pronoun cannot be anaphorically linked to 
the indefinite. This prediction appears to be correct. 
Accessibility is in the first instance a relation between DRSs; derivatively, it is 
also a relation between discourse referents. [6c1] is accessible to [6c2], but not the 
other way round, and therefore the discourse referents introduced in [6c1], i.e. x 
and z, are accessible from [6c2], but conversely, if we are in [6c1] we have no 
access to [6c2] and its discourse referents, i.e. y. Thus in [6c] anaphora is not 
possible because y is not accessible to z. In [4a], by contrast, anaphora is 
possible, because x and y are accessible to v and w (the accessibility relation 
being reflexive). The notion of accessibility is crucial to DRT's account of 
anaphora, and it is important to note that it is not stipulated, but is entailed by the 
semantics of the DRS language. [6c1] is accessible to [6c2] because every 
embedding function that must be considered for [6c2] is an extension of an 
embedding function for [6c1], and it is for this reason that every discourse 
referent in [6c1] is also defined in [6c2]. The converse, however, does not hold. 
Like negated sentences, conditionals give rise to complex DRS-conditions, too. 
(7) gives an example: 
[7b] is the sentence DRS which corresponds to [7a], and assuming for 
convenience that this sentence is uttered in an empty context, it is also the initial 
DRS of the discourse. The complex condition in this structure is interpreted as 
follows: if f is to verify [b1] in the current model, then f(x) must be an individual 
called “Pedro”, and every extension of f which verifies [b2] must itself be 
extendable to a function that verifies [b3]. It follows from this that [b1] is 
accessible to [b2], which in its turn is accessible to [b3], and therefore v may be 
linked up to x (accessibility being a transitive relation) and w to y. The result is 
[7c], which is equivalent to [7d], both DRSs saying that Pedro beats every 
[6a] It is grey.
[6b] [z: grey(z)]
[6c] [1 x, z: Pedro(x), ¬[2 y:donkey(y), owns(x,y)], grey(z)]
[7a] If Pedro owns a donkey, he beats it.
[7b] [1 x: Pedro(x), [2 y: donkey(y), owns(x,y)] ⇒ [3 v, w: beats
(v,w)]]
[7c] [1 x, v: v = x, Pedro(x), [2 y, w: w = y, donkey(y), owns(x,y)] 
⇒ [3 : beats(v,w)] ]
[7d] [1 x: Pedro(x), [2 y: donkey(y), owns(x,y)] ⇒ [3 : beats(x,y)] ]
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donkey he owns.  
3.2 Quantifiers vs. indefinites 
The interpretation of quantified donkey sentences is very similar to what we have 
just seen: 
There are two ways of spelling out the interpretation of so-called duplex 
conditions of the form K(∀x)K′. On its weak interpretation, [8a] means that 
every farmer who owns a donkey beats at least one of the donkeys he owns; on its 
strong interpretation the sentence says that every farmer beats every donkey he 
owns. While the strong reading is the most natural choice for [8a], other donkey 
sentences prefer a weak reading: 
[9] Every farmer who owns a tractor uses it to drive to church on 
Sundays. 
The most likely interpretation for [9] to have is that every tractor-owning farmer 
uses one of his tractors to drive to church. 
The distinction between weak and strong interpretations is somewhat mysterious, 
because it doesn't seem to be an ordinary ambiguity. For example, donkey 
sentences with existential quantifiers don't seem to license strong readings: 
[10] Some farmers who own a donkey beat it. 
This can only be construed as saying that some donkey-owning farmers beat at 
least one of their donkeys. More generally, the universally quantified donkey 
sentences seem to be the only ones to license both interpretations. It is not 
entirely clear why this should be the case (see Kanazawa 1994, Geurts 2002). 
Whether weak or strong, the interpretation of a condition of the form K(Qx)K′, 
where Q may be any quantifier, makes K accessible to K′, and in this respect 
(which is the fulcrum of the DRT analysis) conditionals and quantified sentences 
are the same. Consequently, the discourse referents x and y in [8b2] are accessible 
to v and w [8b3], and the latter may be equated to the former. The resulting 
representation is [8c], which is equivalent to [8d]. 
[8a] Every farmer who owns a donkey beats it.
[8b] [1 [2 x, y: farmer(x), donkey(y), owns(x,y)](∀x)[3 v, w: beats
(v,w)] ]
[8c] [1 [2 x, y, v, w: v = x, w = y, farmer(x), donkey(y), owns(x,y)]
(∀x)[3 : beats(v,w)] ]
[8d] [1 [2 x, y: farmer(x), donkey(y), owns(x,y)](∀x)[3 : beats
(x,y)] ]
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The DRT analysis of quantified expressions like “all” or “most” is fairly 
standard. A quantifier binds a variable and delivers the truth conditions one 
should expect. Indefinites are different. An indefinite like “a donkey” is treated 
not as a quantifier but simply as device for introducing a discourse referent and 
one or more conditions; on the DRT account, indefinites have no quantifying 
force of their own. What quantifying force they seem to have is not theirs, but 
derives from the environment in which they occur. If the semantic material 
associated with “a donkey” is introduced in the main DRS, as in [4c], the 
quantifying effect will be existential, owing to the fact that this DRS is verified in 
a model M iff there is a way of verifying it in M. If the semantic material 
associated with “a donkey” is introduced in the antecedent of a conditional, as in 
[7d], the quantifying effect will be universal, owing to the fact that a condition K 
⇒ K′ is verified in M iff every way of verifying K can be extended to a way of 
verifying K′. This view on indefinites lies at the heart of DRT. 
DRT was one of the first semantic theories to go beyond the sentence boundary, 
and take into account how the interpretation of an expression may depend on the 
preceding discourse. Looking back at the examples discussed in the foregoing, 
we see that, if the DRT approach is on the right track, sentence boundaries are not 
as important as the Fregean conception of language (which continues to have a 
strong hold on linguistics and philosophy) would have it. In particular, there is 
essentially no difference between the DRT analyses of cross-sentential anaphora, 
as exemplified by the mini-discourse [2]-[3a], and sentence-internal anaphora, as 
in [7a] or [9a]. In either case, the pronoun simply serves to pick up an accessible 
discourse referent. This raises the question how DRT's new-fangled notion of 
anaphora relates to the dichotomy between referential and bound-variable 
pronouns. Curiously, this issue doesn't seem to have received much attention thus 
far. 
3.3 One- vs. two-level versions of DRT 
In the foregoing we assumed that the contribution of a sentence to the discourse, 
as represented by a DRS, was obtained in two steps. In the first one, a sentence 
DRS was constructed in a compositional way; this part of the construction 
process we took for granted, but its implementation wouldn't be too difficult. In 
the second step, the sentence DRS was merged with the DRS representing the 
prior discourse, and anaphoric references were resolved. This two-stage 
procedure has become the industrial standard, but the original version of DRT 
(Kamp 1981, Kamp and Reyle 1993) was monostratal in the sense that one set of 
rules took care of both tasks at once. In the meantime, Kamp and his co-workers 
have adopted the two-step method, too (e.g. Kamp et al. 2005). 
In one-level versions of DRT, a single set of rules is used to obtain the semantic 
contribution of a sentence. To take a simple example, if the sentence is “It is 
grey”, the first rule to apply will say that the semantic correlate of the subject is 
an argument to the predicate expressed by “is grey”. Then the two main parts of 
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the sentence are analysed further, and the pronoun “it” triggers a rule which at 
once deals with the pronoun's lexical content and its context dependence; i.e. it 
says that we must select a new discourse referent, link it to a discourse referent 
made available by the preceding discourse, and update the DRS so as to record 
these changes. In two-level versions of DRT there is no such rule. Its duties are 
divided between two separate mechanisms. In the first stage, a separate DRS is 
constructed for the sentence, in which pronouns prompt the introduction of new 
discourse referents which are marked as being anaphoric (we use underlining for 
this purpose). In the second stage, there is a general mechanism for dealing with 
discourse referents that are thus marked. 
The distinction between one- and two-level versions of DRT is of interest for at 
least two reasons. First, once we go beyond basic DRT, the two-stage system 
may actually be more economical overall. For example, if DRT is extended for 
dealing with presuppositions (see §5), the one-pass approach becomes unwieldy. 
Secondly, and perhaps more importantly, two-stage theories may be viewed as 
implementing a distinction between semantics and pragmatics which has some 
prima facie plausibility: in the first stage a representation is computed which is 
projected from the sentence's lexico-grammatical structure, while in the second 
stage, context-dependent aspects of meaning are dealt with. This division of labor 
is reminiscent of the traditional dichotomy between compositional semantics and 
non-compositional pragmatics, but it should be noted that the two do not 
coincide. Usually, the “semantical” part of a two-stage version of DRT is not 
compositional in the Fregean sense, because its output is essentially incomplete; 
it may contain anaphoric “gaps”, for example. Therefore, even if a sentence DRS 
admits of a truth-conditional interpretation, it will typically fall short of capturing 
everything that is conventionally thought to belong to truth-conditional content. 
4. The DRS language: syntax, semantics, accessibility 
In this section we give a more precise description of the DRS language than we 
have done so far. We define the syntax of the language, present a model-theoretic 
interpretation, and discuss the notion of accessibility, which figures so 
prominently in DRT's account of anaphora. 
4.1 Syntax 
DRSs are set-theoretic objects built from discourse referents and DRS-
conditions. A DRS-condition is either atomic, in which case it consists of a 
predicate and a suitable number of discourse referents, or complex, in which case 
it embeds one or two DRSs. Hence, the definition of the DRS language is by 
simultaneous recursion: 
DRSs and DRS-conditions 
 A DRS K is a pair < UK, ConK>, where UK is a set of discourse referents, 
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and ConK is a set of DRS-conditions. 
 If P is an n-place predicate, and x1, …, xn are discourse referents, then P
(x1, …, xn) is a DRS-condition.  
 If x and y are discourse referents, then x = y is a DRS-condition.  
 If K and K′ are DRSs, then ¬K, K⇒ K′, and K v K′ are DRS-conditions.  
 If K and K′ are DRSs and x is a discourse referent, then K(∀x)K′ is a 
DRS-condition.  
Note that there are no conditions corresponding to conjoined sentences. Such 
sentences are dealt with, rather, by merging the DRSs associated with their parts, 
where the merge of two DRSs K and K′ is defined as their pointwise union: 
The merge operation is also used for combining a sentence DRS with the DRS 
representing the preceding discourse, so the idea is that there is no principled 
distinction between (clausal) conjunction and sentence concatenation.[2] 
Officially, DRSs are set-theoretical objects, but in this article we use a linear 
notation. Many sources, including Kamp's own work, employ a graphical “box 
notation” which is sometimes clearer, but less parsimonious and more difficult to 
type. To illustrate the various schemes, here are three ways of representing the 
content of a conditional donkey sentence: 
To be clear: the choice between the above three representations is one of 
convenience, and not intended to have any theoretical significance. 
4.2 Accessibility 
Accessibility is a relation between DRSs that is transitive and reflexive, i.e. it is a 
preorder. More in particular, it is the smallest preorder for which the following 
holds, for all DRSs K, K′, and K″: if ConK contains a condition of the form … 
DRS-merge
• K⊕K′ =   < UK ∪ UK′, ConK ∪ ConK′>
Official DRS: <{}, <{x, y}, {farmer(x), donkey(y), owns(x,y)}> ⇒ <{}, 
{beats(x,y)}>} >
Linear notation: [: [x, y: farmer(x), donkey(y), owns(x,y)] ⇒ [: beats(x,y)]]
Box notation:
 
x y
farmer(x) 
donkey(y) 
owns(x,y)
 ⇒ 
 
beats(x,y)
Page 12 of 27Discourse Representation Theory (Stanford Encyclopedia of Philosophy)
6-9-2012mhtml:file://V:\repository\Studenten\__Klaar_voor_automatische_koppeling\Geurts, B....
 ¬K′, then K is accessible to K′  
 K′v K″, then K is accessible to K′ and K″  
 K′ ⇒ K″, then K is accessible to K′ and K′ is accessible to K″  
 K′(∀x)K″, then K is accessible to K′ and K′ is accessible to K″ 
To illustrate, in the following schematic representations, every DRS is accessible 
to all and only those DRSs whose number does not exceed its own (so every DRS 
is accessible to itself): 
 [1 … [2 … ](∀x)[3 … ¬[4 … ] ] ] 
 
 [1 … [2 … ] ⇒ [3 … ¬[4 … ] ] ]  
The accessible domain of a DRS K, AK, is the set of discourse referents that 
occur in some K′ that is accessible to K, i.e., AK = {x:  K′ is accessible to K and 
x ∈ UK′}. The main constraint which DRT imposes on the interpretation of 
anaphora is this: 
Accessibility constraint 
A pronoun is represented by a discourse referent x which must be 
equated to some discourse referent y ∈ AK, where K is the DRS in 
which x is introduced.  
It is important to note that neither the notion of accessibility nor the accessibility 
constraint need be stipulated. For, as we will presently see, both follow from the 
way the DRS language is interpreted (cf. the notion of variable binding in 
standard predicate logic). Thus, we are not at liberty to modify the accessibility 
relation, should we wish to do so, unless we simultaneously revise the truth 
conditions associated with the DRS language. The accessibility constraint is a 
semantic one. 
As discussed in §2, the main syntactic constraint on bound-variable pronouns is 
that they be c-commanded by their antecedents. The domain of the accessibility 
constraint overlaps with that of the c-command constraint, but it is wider. For one 
thing, sentence boundaries don't affect accessibility. For another, within the 
confines of a sentence, the semantic correlate of an expression E1 may be 
accessible to that of E2, even if E1 doesn't c-command E2. To illustrate this point, 
consider the conditional donkey sentence in [1a] and its sentence DRS in [1b]: 
Syntactically speaking, neither “a farmer” nor “a donkey” can bind (in the sense 
of Chomsky 1986 and the immense secondary literature it generated) an 
expression beyond the smallest clause in which they occur. In particular, neither 
[1a] [S [S If [S [NP a farmer] [VP owns a donkey]] [S he beats it] ]
[1b] [1 : [2 x, y: farmer(x), donkey(y), owns(x,y)] ⇒ [3 u, v: beats
(u,v)] ]
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can bind any of the pronouns in the main clause of [1a]. But the discourse 
referents associated with these indefinites, i.e. x and y, are in the accessible 
domain of [1b3], and therefore the anaphoric discourse referents in this embedded 
DRS can be linked to x and y. Put otherwise, they are bindable at a semantic but 
not at a syntactic level. 
4.3 Semantics 
The truth-conditional semantics of the DRS language is given by defining when 
an embedding function verifies a DRS in a given model. An embedding function 
is a partial mapping from discourse referents to individuals. Given two 
embedding functions f and g and a DRS K, we say that g extends f with respect to 
K, or f[K]g for short, iff Dom(g) = Dom(f) ∪ UK, and for all x in Dom(f): f(x) = 
g(x). Viewing functions as set-theoretic objects, this can be formulated more 
succinctly as follows:  
f[K]g iff f ⊆ g and Dom(g) = Dom(f) ∪ UK
 
In the following we define what it takes for an embedding function to verify a 
DRS or DRS-condition in a given model. As usual, a model M is a pair <D,I>, 
where D is a set of individuals, and I is an interpretation function that assigns sets 
of individuals to one-place predicates, sets of pairs to two-place predicates, and 
so on. To enhance the legibility of our definition somewhat we omit the 
qualification “in M” throughout: 
The last clause gives a strong interpretation to universal duplex conditions (cf. 
§3.2); the weak interpretation is obtainable as follows: 
Verifying embeddings
• f verifies a DRS K iff f verifies all conditions in ConK.
• f verifies P(x1, …, xn) iff <f(x1), …, f(xn)> ∈ I(P).
• f verifies x = y iff f(x) = f(y).
• f verifies ¬K iff there is no g such that f[K]g and g verifies K.
• f verifies K v K′ iff f there is a g such that f[K]g and g verifies K or 
K′.
• f verifies K ⇒ K′ iff, for all f[K]g such that g verifies K, there is an 
h such that g[K′]h and h verifies K′.
• f verifies K(∀x)K′ iff, for all individuals d ∈ DM and for all f[K]g 
such that g(x) = d and g verifies K, every h such that g[K′]h 
verifies K′.
• f verifies K(∀x)K′ iff, for all individuals d ∈ DM for which there 
is a g such that f[K]g, g(x) = d, and g verifies K, there is an h such 
that g[K′]h and h verifies K′.
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A DRS is true in a given model iff we can find a verifying embedding for it, as 
follows: 
To see how accessibility follows from these definitions, the critical junctures are 
the points at which extensions of embedding functions are called for. For 
example, consider a schematic DRS with a conditional in it: 
[2] [x: A(x), [y: B(x,y)] ⇒ [z: C(x,y,z)] ]  
This DRS is true iff we can find an embedding function f, Dom(f) = {x}, which 
verifies all conditions in [2], which is to say that f(x) must be an A, and f verifies 
the complex condition [y: B(x,y)] ⇒ [z: C(x,y,z)]. The latter requirement is met 
iff every extension g of f, Dom(g) = {x,y}, such that g verifies [y: B(x,y)] can be 
extended to a function h, Dom(h) = {x,y,z}, such that h verifies [z: C(x,y,z)]. 
Hence, no matter how we choose g, g(x) must be the same individual as f(x), and 
for any g, no matter how we choose h, h(x) and h(y) must be the same as g(x) and 
g(y), respectively. This is why x is in the accessible domain associated with the 
antecedent of the conditional, and why y is in the accessible domain associated 
with the consequent. 
5. Beyond the basics 
The purpose of this section is to illustrate how the ideas lying at the heart of DRT 
have been applied elsewhere, confining our attention to the domains of tense and 
presupposition. In both cases, we will find interpretative dependencies 
reminiscent of the dependency relation between an anaphor and its antecedent, 
and we will describe, if only in outline, how basic DRT has been extended so as 
to explain the similarities. 
5.1 Tense 
In the early 1970s, it was pointed out that there are systematic parallels between 
tenses and pronouns (Partee 1973), and DRT was partly born from the conviction 
that a theory of interpretation should account for these parallels. Partee (1984) 
herself worked out some of these ideas in the DRT framework. In the following 
we will briefly discuss some of Partee's observations, and outline a DRT 
treatment. 
Intuitively, the indefinite description “a donkey” in the opening sentence of [1a] 
Truth
A DRS K is true in a model M iff there is an embedding function f 
such that Dom(f) = UK and f verifies K in M.
[1a] Pedro owns a donkey. He beats it.
[1b] Yesterday, Pedro tried to kiss Juanita. She slapped him.
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serves to introduce an entity that is subsequently picked up the pronoun “it” in the 
second sentence, and the DRT account of indefinites and pronouns seeks to 
formalize this intuitive picture. [1b] shows that a very similar phenomenon occurs 
in the temporal domain, for in this case it is natural to construe the past tense of 
the second sentence as being anaphorically dependent on the content of the first: 
presumably, Juanita slapped Pedro right after he tried to kiss her. In order to 
capture this idea, DRT adopts an event-based semantics, treating events as 
semantic values of a designated class of discourse referents. Sentences are now 
construed like indefinite descriptions in that they, too, serve to introduce 
discourse referents. For example, the first sentence in [1b] introduces a discourse 
referent of the event type that represents Pedro's attempting to kiss Juanita, and 
the tense morpheme in “slapped” is construed as referring back, very much like 
an anaphoric pronoun, to that event: by default, the time of Juanita's slapping 
Pedro will be taken to be immediately after the time of him trying to kiss her. 
Our second example involves what one might call “donkey tense”: 
In an event-based semantics, it is natural to construe [2b] as quantifying over 
events, just like [2a] quantifies over individuals. In conjunction with the DRT 
treatment of quantification, this allows us to interpret the tense in “slapped” as 
referring back to the event introduced in the subordinate clause, along the 
following lines (where “⊃⊂” stands for the “right after” relation, e″ is the 
variable introduced by the tense in “slapped”, and e″ indicates that e″ requires an 
antecedent): 
In [3a] the tense introduces an anaphoric element, which can be bound in the 
restrictor of the quantifier, just as an ordinary donkey pronoun might be bound. 
The result, after a minor simplification, is [3b], which says that every event e of 
Pedro trying to kiss Juanita is immediately followed by an event e′ of her 
slapping him. Note that, although this DRS captures the most natural 
interpretation of the past tense in “slapped”, it leaves the past tense in “tried” 
unaccounted for. But this is as it should be, for if tense is anaphoric, then that 
tense, too, should be linked to a salient time point, which seems to be right: in the 
absence of a context that furnishes such a time, [2b] is simply infelicitous; it is 
like saying “He is handsome” when it is not clear whom the pronoun is intended 
to refer to. 
[2a] Every farmer who owns a donkey beats it.
[2b] Whenever Pedro tried to kiss Juanita, she slapped him.
[3a] [x, y: Pedro(x), Juanita(y), 
[e: try-to-kiss(e,x,y)](∀e)[e′, e″ : e″ ⊃⊂ e′, slap(e′,y,x)]] 
[3b] [x, y: Pedro(x), Juanita(y), 
[e: try-to-kiss(e,x,y)](∀e)[e′: e ⊃⊂ e′, slap(e′,y,x)] ] 
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5.2 Presupposition 
Presuppositions are chunks of information associated with particular lexical items 
or syntactic constructions. There are many such items and constructions, and the 
following is just a small selection:  
Factive verbs 
It-clefts 
Definites 
Someone who utters any of the [a] sentences commits himself to the truth of the 
respective [b] sentence. Of course, this does nothing to distinguish 
presuppositions from ordinary entailments, but the difference becomes apparent 
when we embed presuppositional expressions or constructions in non-entailing 
contexts, as in: 
Here [5a] is embedded in the scope of a negation operator and a modal operator, 
respectively, and it appears that these sentences commit a speaker to the truth of 
[5b] just as much as [5a] does. This behavior sets presuppositions apart from 
ordinary entailments. 
Generally speaking, presuppositions tend to escape from any embedded position 
in the sense that, if a sentence S contains a presupposition-inducing expression P, 
an utterance of S will usually imply that P holds. This is only generally speaking, 
because this rule, though correct in the majority of cases, does not hold without 
exceptions: 
While the [a] sentences would normally commit a speaker to the claim that Pedro 
has a donkey, the same does not hold for the [b] sentences. It appears, therefore, 
[4a] Juan knows that Pedro beats his donkey.
[4b] Pedro beats his donkey.
[5a] It's in the stable that Pedro beats his donkey.
[5b] Pedro beats his donkey.
[6a] Pedro beats his donkey.
[6b] Pedro has a donkey.
[7a] It isn't in the stable that Pedro beats his donkey.
[7b] Maybe it's in the stable that Pedro beats his donkey.
[8a] It may be that Pedro is a mean farmer, and that he beats his 
donkey.
[8b] It may be that Pedro has a donkey, and that he beats his donkey.
[9a] If Pedro is a mean farmer, he beats his donkey.
[9b] If Pedro has a donkey, he beats his donkey.
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that presuppositions are typically though not invariably inherited by the sentences 
in which they occur. This is the so-called “projection problem” for 
presuppositions. 
Considering that anaphora and presupposition were widely discussed from the 
late 1960s onwards, it took a remarkably long time before it was discovered that, 
in some respects at least, the two phenomena are very similar (van der Sandt 
1992, Kripke 2009). To see how, consider the following pairs: 
It is true that the variants with the “that”-complements are slightly odd, but 
actually the fact that they are proves the point we want to make; for it is clear 
that, in these examples, the pronoun “it” and the clause “that he owns a donkey” 
perform the same duty, and if the latter sounds somewhat off it is presumably 
because the former does the job just as well. 
While the factive verb “know” triggers the presupposition that its clausal 
complement is true, this presupposition is neutralized in [10b] and [10c]. If 
presuppositions behave similarly to anaphoric pronouns, it is clear why that 
should be so: in both cases, the presupposition is bound sentence-internally, just 
like the neuter pronoun is bound. 
Presupposed information is information that is presented as given, and according 
to the so-called “binding theory” of presupposition this means that 
presuppositions want to have discourse referents to bind to (van der Sandt 1992, 
Geurts 1999). However, whereas anaphoric pronouns are rarely interpretable in 
the absence of a suitable antecedent, the same does not hold for all 
presupposition-inducing expressions. For instance, a speaker may felicitously 
assert that he met “Pedro's sister” even if he knows full well that his audience 
wasn't aware that Pedro has a sister. In such cases, Karttunen (1974) and 
Stalnaker (1974) suggested, presuppositions are generally accommodated, which 
is to say that the hearer accepts the information as given, and revises his 
representation of the context accordingly. Accommodation, thus understood, is a 
form of exploitation in Grice's sense: the purpose of presuppositional expressions 
is to signal that this or that information is given, and if some information is new 
but not particularly interesting or controversial (like the fact that somebody has a 
sister) the speaker may choose to “get it out of the way” by presuppositional 
means. 
The binding theory incorporates the notion of accommodation as follows. 
[10a] Pedro owns a donkey. Juan knows {it/that he owns a donkey}.
[10b] If Pedro owns a donkey, Juan knows {it/that he owns a 
donkey}.
[10c] Every farmer who owns a donkey knows {it/that he owns a 
donkey}.
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Presuppositions, according to the theory, introduce information that prefers to be 
linked to discourse referents that are already available in the DRS, and in this 
respect they are like pronouns. However, if a suitable discourse referent is not 
available, a new one will be accommodated, and the presupposition is linked to 
that. Generally speaking, accommodation is not an option in the interpretation of 
pronouns, and a possible reason for this is that a pronoun's descriptive content is 
relatively poor. Being told that “she” is wonderful is not particularly helpful if it 
isn't clear who the pronoun is meant to refer to. By contrast, if the speaker refers 
to “Pedro's sister” there is more to go on, and accommodation becomes feasible. 
Hence, the binding theory views pronouns as a special class of presuppositional 
expressions. While all presupposition triggers prefer to be bound, pronouns 
almost always must be bound. According to the binding theory, this is because 
pronouns are descriptively attenuated, and therefore cannot be construed by way 
of accommodation. 
6. Representationalism, attitudes, and compositionality 
The DRT framework is of interest to philosophers of language primarily because 
it has enabled perspicuous treatments of a range of natural language phenomena 
that have proved recalcitrant over many years, for example the phenomena 
involving donkey anaphora, tense and presupposition discussed above. But there 
are also several aspects of the DRT framework itself which are of philosophical 
interest, largely connected with the status of DRSs as mental entities. 
DRT is a representational theory of interpretation. In the DRT framework, 
sentences have meanings, if at all, only in a derivative sense: a sentence prompts 
the hearer to modify his DRS, and it is DRSs that have a truth-conditional 
interpretation. Thus, a sentence causes a DRS Ki to be transformed into a DRS 
Ki+1 (usually, though not invariably, the process will consist in adding 
information to Ki), and at a remove there is an associated transition at the 
semantical level, from Ki's interpretation to Ki+1's. Hence, if we could cut out the 
representational middleman, we would have a theory that defines sentence 
meaning in dynamic terms, as a transition from one semantic object to another. 
Thus arises the question whether or not the representational level can be 
dispensed with. Kamp (1981) claimed that representations were essential to his 
ur-version of DRT, which was a subset of our basic DRT, but in the meantime he 
was proved wrong by dynamic semantic theories that recast classical DRT in 
purely semantical terms: starting with Barwise (1987) and Rooth (1987), then 
(with somewhat more splash) Groenendijk and Stokhof (1989, 1991), and, in 
perhaps its neatest formulation, Muskens (1996). 
What does it mean to say that a theory, or framework, is intrinsically 
representational, or that the dynamic semantic theories listed above are not? To 
be sure, a very determined semanticist could force all the apparatus of DRSs into 
his models, producing a fine-grained semantic theory which, strictly speaking, 
did not make use of a level of syntactic representations (perhaps reminiscent of 
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the dynamic property theory defined by Chierchia 1994). So in this sense the 
representations of DRT are dispensible. But this is a very weak sense. What it 
suggests is that the issue of whether a theory should be seen as representational is 
not clear cut. 
Consider Montague Grammar. It uses a representational language, Intensional 
Logic, but Montague (1970) showed that this use of a higher-order logical 
representation language was just a convenience, and completely dispensible. 
Specifically, Montague Grammar can be used to define a function directly from 
sentences of a fragment of natural language to model-theoretic entities. The same 
is true of dynamic semantic theories, except that the model-theoretic entities are a 
little different from Montague's. Note, though, that dynamic meanings capture 
information about which entities are available for later anaphoric reference, 
whereas Montagovian meanings do not. If two sentences have the same truth 
conditions, then they should have the same Montagovian meanings, but may 
differ in their dynamic meanings. It is only if the two sentences have both the 
same truth conditions and the same anaphoric potential that they will have the 
same Montagovian meanings and the same dynamic meanings in theories like 
those of Groenendijk and Stokhof and Muskens. But this does not in itself make 
dynamic meanings representational. So what makes DRT representations 
different?  
In DRT, even if two sentences have both the same truth conditions and the same 
anaphoric potential, they may still have different meanings. Indeed, there is no 
defining criterion for identity of meanings in DRT, truth conditional, anaphoric, 
or otherwise: two sentences have the same DRT meanings just in case the 
construction algorithm gives them the same representations.[3] Thus, for example, 
in Montague Grammar we would expect [1a]-[1c] to all have identical meanings. 
In a dynamic semantic theory, we might expect [1a] to differ in meaning from 
[1b], because [1a] freely licenses anaphora to the painting that Jane likes, but for 
[1b] such anaphora is at least highly marked. Yet on a dynamic semantic theory, 
[1a] and [1c] would still have identical meanings. In DRT, different 
representations would be formed for each of [1a]-[1c]. 
There is, then, at the very least, a methodological issue separating DRT from non-
representational frameworks: a non-representational framework is defined with a 
natural criterion for identity of meaning of two sentences in mind, and this 
criterion is related to the information conveyed by those sentences. But in a 
representational framework like DRT the representations themselves provide the 
only criterion for judging identity of meaning. So is representationalism only 
methodological, a mere convenience? The answer is surely no, for 
[1a] Jane likes a painting.
[1b] It is not the case that Jane doesn't like a painting.
[1c] Jane likes a painting and either it is raining or it isn't.
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representationalism involves a strong philosophical claim, namely the claim that 
DRSs are mental representations, and in some way capture objects of thought. 
This philosophical position is at the heart of at least one application of DRT, 
namely the treatment of attitudes. And here we refer not merely to the linguistic 
issue of how attitude descriptions are to be interpreted, but also to the 
philosophical and psychological issue of what it is to be the bearer of a mental 
attitude. 
One of the greatest problems in the treatment of attitudes is the issue of logical 
omniscience: humans are cognitively limited agents, and are not aware of all the 
consequences of their beliefs and desires. On this basis, Kamp (1990), for 
example, argues that the objects of thought should not be seen as purely model-
theoretic entities, for example a set of belief worlds, as is common in logics of 
belief from Hintikka (1962) onwards. Rather, the logic of belief and other 
attitudes must involve mental representations. The problem of logical 
omniscience is then resolved in terms of the failure of human agents to perform 
logically complete computations over these representations. Such structural 
models of DRT as a theory of the attitudes have been developed not only by 
Kamp, but also by Asher (1986,1989) and Zeevat (1984,1989a). Note that this 
body of work not only deals with the issue of logical omniscience, but also with a 
range of other philosophical problems. Perhaps most notable among these is the 
issue of how we can bear attitudes to objects in the real world, a problem that is 
sharpened somewhat if attitudes are modeled using syntactic representations. 
The solution adopted by Kamp (1990) and others involves anchoring, whereby 
the DRS language is extended to allow discourse referents mentioned in a DRS to 
be connected by a special (anchoring) function to objects in the outside world, or 
to referents in other attitudinal representations. The device of anchoring has been 
used both for the treatment of attitudes and for the related issue of the 
interpretation of attitude descriptions, specifically in the analysis of problems 
involving differences between de re and de dicto attitude sentences. But it should 
be realized that a DRT treatment of the interpretation of attitude descriptions need 
not imply that mental attitudes are themselves understood as involving DRSs. For 
example, Geurts (1999) develops a DRT treatment of attitudes and modals, but 
provides truth conditions for DRS representations of attitude descriptions in 
terms of an underlying model in which the objects of attitudes are not structural, 
but rather involve a neo-Hintikkan relation between individuals and sets of 
worlds. 
Not only is DRT a representational theory of interpretation, it is a non-
compositional theory as well. These two features are intertwined. Consider, for 
instance, the way pronouns are interpreted in basic DRT, by first setting up a 
referent marker, which is subsequently linked to another discourse referent. This 
is a non-deterministic process, but even if it were not, it is clear that the anaphoric 
link is not part of the meaning of the pronoun. In standard DRT, the pronoun does 
not, in and of itself, introduce something into the DRS that has a model-theoretic 
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interpretation. A standard statement of compositionality would say that the 
meaning of compounds must be a function of the meaning of their components 
and their mode of combination. But if some of the components, like pronouns, do 
not introduce into the DRS any object that can naturally be described as the 
meaning of that object, then it is clear that we do not have a compositional 
system. 
How bad is it that we lose compositionality? It is generally agreed that some of 
the standard arguments for compositionality are not particularly compelling. We 
don't need compositionality to explain why people can understand an indefinite 
number of sentences, and we don't need it for explaining how languages can be 
learned. To explain such facts, it suffices that there is some procedure for 
establishing the meanings of sentences, but it is not strictly necessary for this 
procedure to be compositional. Compositionality is often viewed as a 
methodological principle (e.g. Groenendijk and Stokhof 1989;1991, Janssen 
1997, Dever 1999), since any model of interpretation can be made compositional 
if we are sufficiently relaxed about the nature of lexical meanings and/or the 
syntactic structures over which the compositional theory is defined. In the case of 
DRT, the standard approaches to making the system compositional involve 
dispensing with Kamp's construction algorithm, and replacing it with a system in 
which DRSs can be composed either through suitable merge operations (Zeevat 
1989b), or, in dynamic semantic systems like those of Groenendijk and Stokhof 
(1989) and Muskens (1996) discussed above, through use of function application 
in a lambda calculus. But it is fair to say that while most such systems capture 
meanings for sentences that are closely related to those of original DRT, they do 
not capture every aspect of DRT. In particular, anaphora resolution is part of 
DRT, but in dynamic semantic systems anaphora resolution is assumed to be 
performed by a separate component of the theory. Yet even this aspect of DRT 
could, in principle, be captured compositionally. Indeed, Kamp's original DRT 
could trivially (though uninterestingly) be mapped onto a compositional theory 
with precisely the same coverage. We would simply take meanings to be partial 
functions from DRSs to sets of DRSs, and then replace each construction rule 
with an appropriate such function. For example, the pronoun meaning could map 
a DRS to a set of new DRSs in which the pronoun has been resolved to various 
values. Sentence (and discourse) meanings would be obtained by composing such 
functions appropriately, producing for any sentence a set of DRSs. 
Compositionality and representationalism are issues that have produced great 
disagreement amongst semanticists and philosophers of language, though less so 
nowadays than they did in the 1980s. The methodological view of 
compositionality has reduced what appeared once to be a substantive argument to 
a matter of taste, and as regards DRT it has been shown that people who care 
about compositionality are free to adopt a variant of the original system with 
many of its features, but none of its non-compositionality. Similarly, as regards 
representationalism, theorists can now adopt a take-it-or-leave-it approach, unless 
they specifically want to make claims about the status of DRSs as mental 
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representations, e.g. as part of a theory of attitudes and/or attitude reports. And 
here perhaps common sense has prevailed. For from a psychological perspective 
it is surprising that representationalism would ever have raised much ire: if we 
adopt a cognitivist standpoint, and view DRT as a (somewhat abstract) theory of 
the psychology of interpretation, then its representationalism wouldn't be 
particularly controversial. The prevailing psychological winds encourage a view 
of thought as computation over representations of some sort. For most 
psychologists, the controversy is not over whether there exist such 
representations, but over what the representations are like. 
7. Further reading 
Introductions 
Kamp and Reyle (1993), Kamp (1995), Blackburn and Bos (2005), 
van Eijck (2006), van Eijck and Kamp (1997), van Genabith et al. (to 
appear). 
Donkey anaphora 
Heim (1990), Evans (1980), Neale (1990), Kanazawa (1994), Geurts 
(2002), Krifka (1996). 
Presupposition 
van der Sandt (1992), Geurts (1999), Beaver (2002), Beaver and 
Zeevat (2007), Kamp (2001), Kamp and Roßdeutscher (1994), Kamp 
et al. (2005), Krahmer (1998), Blackburn and Bos (2005). 
Tense and aspect 
Kamp and Reyle (1993), Kamp et al. (to appear), Partee (1984). 
Quantification and plurality 
Kamp and Reyle (1993). 
Attitude reports 
Asher (1986, 1989), Zeevat (1996), Kamp (1990), Geurts (1999), 
Maier (2010). 
Discourse structure 
Asher and Lascarides (2003), van Leusen and Muskens (2003), van 
Leusen (2007). 
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Inference systems for DRT 
Kamp and Reyle (1996), Saurer (1993). 
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